Red Sea Geopolitics: Ethiopia’s Stance and Future

The Geopolitical Chessboard: Red Sea Stakes

The Red Sea is one of the world’s most strategic maritime corridors, forming a vital link between the Mediterranean (via the Suez Canal) and the Indian Ocean. A significant proportion of global trade, energy shipments, and raw materials transit this route—making it a global chokepoint whose security (or disruption) has ripple effects across the world.

Because of its strategic value, the Red Sea has attracted intense competition among regional and global actors. Egypt views it as central to its national security, closely tied to control of the Suez. Gulf states like the UAE and Saudi Arabia have increased naval deployments and port investments in the region. Smaller littoral states—Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia—play outsized roles because of their coastal territories. At the same time, global powers such as the United States, China, and European states maintain naval presences and invest in port infrastructure to secure their trade interests.

In this setting, stability in the Red Sea is not a regional luxury—it is essential to the functioning of global supply chains, energy security, and maritime commerce.

Ethiopia’s Historical Quest for Sea Access

Maritime Roots and Imperial Access

Ethiopia’s connection to the sea is not a modern invention. In the pre‐colonial and imperial eras, Ethiopia (and earlier the Aksumite state) engaged in Red Sea and Indian Ocean trade, connecting with Arabian and Indian markets. Control of ports—such as in what became Eritrea and along the Red Sea littoral—bolstered access to commerce, diplomatic contacts, and strategic depth.

Over time, Ethiopia negotiated or coerced access agreements. For example, in 1928, under the Italo-Ethiopian Treaty, Ethiopia was granted a concession in Asseb (in Eritrea) to maintain a road connecting the coast to the interior. (Wikipedia)

Losing the Coast: Eritrea’s Independence

The turning point came in 1993, when Eritrea achieved de facto independence following a UN-sponsored referendum. That left Ethiopia landlocked, severing direct coastal access via Massawa and Assab. The consequences were immediate: Ethiopia became dependent on neighbors’ ports, most critically Djibouti, for nearly all import and export traffic.

This dependency has long been a strategic weakness. In periods of tension, or when regional rivals exert pressure, Ethiopia’s trade routes become vulnerable. The 1998–2000 Ethiopia–Eritrea war provides a historical example: during conflict, Ethiopia’s port access from Eritrea was effectively cut, underscoring its precarious position.

Landlocked: Economic & Strategic Vulnerabilities

Today, Ethiopia remains one of the largest landlocked countries in Africa. An estimated 90–95% of its trade passes through the Port of Djibouti, making it highly vulnerable to external disruptions. (ACLED)

This dependence not only raises transport costs and logistical hurdles but also gives transit states leverage over Ethiopia. If ports or land corridors are disrupted—by political instability, conflict, or diplomatic disputes—the consequences for Ethiopia’s economy could be severe.

Moreover, in the absence of its own naval assets or secure seaward corridors, Ethiopia loses out strategically in the maritime domain, unable to project influence or protect its trade lanes independently.

Recent Developments and Ethiopia’s Assertive Stance

The “Right to Access” Narrative

In recent years, the Ethiopian leadership has shifted its rhetoric: maritime access is no longer a mere convenience but a right and an existential necessity. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has publicly framed Red Sea access as central to Ethiopia’s sovereignty and long‐term viability. (criticalthreats.org)

In October 2023, Abiy called access to the Red Sea “existential,” suggesting that without it, Ethiopia would be deprived of full prosperity. (Martin Plaut)

The Ethiopia–Somaliland MoU

On 1 January 2024, the Ethiopian government and Somaliland (a self-declared state that broke away from Somalia in 1991) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Under the draft terms:

• Somaliland would lease 19–20 km of coastline (in or near the Gulf of Aden) to Ethiopia for 50 years. (Wikipedia)
• In return, Ethiopia would recognize or move toward recognizing Somaliland’s sovereignty. (Wikipedia)
• Ethiopia would gain access to port facilities (particularly Berbera) and possibly naval basing rights. (ACLED)
• Somaliland would receive stakes in Ethiopian economic ventures (e.g., Ethiopian Airlines). (ACLED)

This agreement marked a bold and controversial strategic move by Ethiopia to bypass traditional transit dependencies.

Regional Backlash and International Responses

The MoU triggered immediate controversy. The Somali federal government denounced it as a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty, recalling its ambassador and demanding Ethiopia withdraw. (Wikipedia)

Beyond Somalia, the deal alarmed regional neighbors. Egypt and Eritrea viewed the potential shift in influence in the Red Sea as a threat. Djibouti, whose port traffic could be diverted, also watched warily. (E-International Relations)

Internationally, many raised concerns over destabilization in the Horn of Africa. The African Union and IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) urged restraint. Western countries emphasized respect for territorial integrity and cautioned against unilateral actions. (Al Jazeera Centre for Studies)

The involvement of external actors—such as the UAE, Turkey, and Egypt—further complicated the equation. The UAE has been viewed as supportive of Ethiopia’s MoU, especially given its investments in Horn of Africa ports. (Al Jazeera Centre for Studies) Turkey, meanwhile, has often played a mediation or balancing role. (Al Jazeera Centre for Studies)

Potential Pathways and Obstacles

Possible Routes to Sea Access

Ethiopia’s options for securing maritime access include:

1. Strengthening ties with Djibouti
   Continue investing in port infrastructure, rail and road corridors, and deeper integration with Djibouti. This is the least disruptive path but preserves dependency.
2. Negotiating with Eritrea
   If political relations improve, Ethiopia could seek co‐use or leases at Massawa or Assab. But deep mistrust and strategic divergence complicate such overtures.
3. Access via Sudan / Port Sudan
   In principle, Ethiopia could use corridors through Sudan to Port Sudan. However, Sudan’s internal instability, contested governance, and security risks make this route unpredictable.
4. Somaliland / Berbera corridor
   The MoU with Somaliland is the boldest and most controversial route. If successfully implemented, it could grant Ethiopia direct sea access—but at the cost of diplomatic friction and sovereignty disputes.
5. Multipolar port diversification
   A combined approach: leverage multiple corridors (Djibouti, Somaliland, possibly Eritrea or Sudan) to reduce the risk of overreliance.

Security, Political, and Institutional Challenges

Pursuing any maritime route is riddled with constraints:

• Regional disputes & sovereignty claims
  Somalia’s opposition to Somaliland’s secession is a core challenge. Implementing an Ethiopia–Somaliland deal risks exacerbating conflict in Somalia and the Horn. (Al Jazeera Centre for Studies)
• Fragile states and internal conflict
  Many states in the region face instability. Sudan, for instance, has witnessed recurrent internal violence. Border disputes, militia actors, and weak governance complicate corridor safety.
• Domestic pressures in Ethiopia
  Ethiopia itself is grappling with internal unrest, ethnic tensions, and lingering conflict in regions such as Tigray and Oromia. Such instability may undermine its capacity to project secure control over external corridors.
• Institutional weakness & personalized foreign policy
  Some analysts argue that Ethiopia’s foreign policy under Prime Minister Abiy is highly personalized, lacking robust institutional foundations. That raises concerns about the sustainability and coherence of complex maritime agreements. (ResearchGate)
• External actors’ influence and interference
  Powerful external states have stakes in Red Sea access and stability. The UAE, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and even China may enable or thwart Ethiopian ambitions depending on alliance calculations. (E-International Relations)
• Legal and recognition hurdles
  Any agreement that implies recognition of Somaliland raises thorny legal questions under international law and African Union norms regarding territorial integrity. Ethiopia would be navigating a delicate balance of diplomacy and legality.

The Future of Red Sea Geopolitics and Ethiopia’s Role

Long-Term Implications

If Ethiopia successfully secures reliable maritime access, the balance of power in the Horn could shift. Ethiopia, long bound by its landlocked status, might emerge as a more autonomous actor in regional trade, logistics, and security. New trade corridors could reroute transit routes, challenge Djibouti’s dominance, and reshape regional infrastructure planning.

However, failure or miscalculation could amplify regional instability, spark conflict, and isolate Ethiopia diplomatically.

Realignment of Alliances and New Trade Routes

Ethiopia’s strategic moves may provoke new alliances. Somalia and Egypt, historically aligned on territorial integrity issues, may deepen cooperation with other states to oppose Ethiopia’s unilateral moves. Djibouti might seek to protect its economic relevance. External powers may shift their port investments, naval deployments, and diplomatic alignments based on how Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions evolve.

Cooperation Versus Conflict

The outcome hinges on whether Ethiopia frames its quest as integrative or confrontational. A cooperative framework—based on negotiated corridors, shared sovereignty, and regional infrastructure projects—could foster economic integration and peace. Yet unilateral, coercive, or zero-sum moves risk backlash, provoking military tensions in the Horn.

References & Citations

1. “Ethiopia’s Quest for Sea Access,” ACLED (January 2024) — Ethiopia’s MoU with Somaliland, lease terms, diplomatic reaction. (ACLED)
2. Al Jazeera, “The Ethiopian-Somali Red Sea Agreement in the context of geopolitical rivalry in the Horn of Africa” (1 April 2024) — deal details, regional dynamics. (Al Jazeera Centre for Studies)
3. Tilahun Abere Chanie, “Understanding Ethiopia’s Maritime Deal with Somaliland Through Abiy Ahmed’s Foreign Policy” (International Journal of Geopolitics and Governance, Dec 2024) — analysis of Ethiopia’s foreign policy and deal implications. (ResearchGate)
4. “Ethiopia-Somalia Tensions: Power Dynamics and Extra-Regional Actors in the Red Sea Region,” E-IR (Apr 2025) — regional response, power blocs. (E-International Relations)
5. “Ethiopia Somaliland Port Deal Strains Horn of Africa” (Critical Threats analysis, Jan 2024) — Ethiopia’s framing of sea access as natural right. (criticalthreats.org)
6. “Vying for Regional Leadership in the Horn of Africa,” CSIS (Feb 2025) — implications of the MoU and broader Horn dynamics. (CSIS)
7. Mebratu Kelecha, “Ethiopia’s Red Sea gambit raises tensions in Horn of Africa” (LSE blog, Jan 2024) — background, reactions, sovereignty concerns. (LSE Blogs)
8. “Red Sea Reckonings: Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Unraveling of Pretoria 2,” Martin Plaut (Aug 2025) — Abiy’s existential narrative, border tensions. (Martin Plaut)
9. “The Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement and the enduring relevance of sea power,” UNAV Global Affairs (analysis) — MoU terms, recognition issues, regional impact. (Universidad de Navarra)
10. “2024 Ethiopia–Somaliland memorandum of understanding,” Wikipedia (aggregated summary) — key facts of the MoU, joint recognition clause. (Wikipedia)
11. “Ankara Declaration,” Wikipedia (Dec 2024) — reconciliation agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia following the MoU rift. (Wikipedia)
12. “Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1928,” Wikipedia — historic treaty granting Ethiopia access concession at Asseb. (Wikipedia)